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Abstract 
The new Basel Capital Accord (Basel II), published in its final form in June 2006, 
established new and revised capital requirements for banks. In this paper we analyze and 
estimate the possible effects of the new rules on the pricing of bank loans. We do that for 
the two approaches for capital requirements (Internal and Standardized) available to 
banks and make a distinction between retail (mainly households) and corporate 
customers. Our loan equation is based on a model of a banking firm facing uncertainty 
operating in an imperfectly competitive loan market. We use Israeli economic data and 
data of a leading Israeli bank, including probability of default of its retail and corporate 
customers. The main results indicate that high quality corporates and retail customers will 
enjoy a reduction in loan interest rates in (large) banks which, most probably, will adopt 
the IRB approach. On the other hand high risk customers will benefit by shifting to 
(small) banks which, most probably, will that adopt the Standardized approach. 
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1. Introduction 
In June 2006 the Basel Committee on banking supervision published its newly revised 
capital requirements known as the new Basel Capital Accord (Basel II). The purpose of 
the new Capital Accord is to more effectively match regulatory capital to the underlying 
risks faced by banks and thus improving the decisions of banks and the effectiveness of 
banking regulation. This is achieved by improving the risk sensitivity of the capital ratios, 
especially with respect to credit risk, and by encouraging improved risk management on 
the part of the banks1. 
The new Basel Capital Accord consists of three pillars, (See Basel (2006)): pillar 1 
presents the calculation of the total minimum capital requirements for credit, market and 
operational risk; pillar 2 discusses the key principals of the process of supervisory review 
of capital adequacy; pillar 3 outlines the measures necessary for promoting market 
discipline in the banking market. In this paper we concentrate on the first pillar and 
examine the effect of the new Accord on the behavior of banks, specifically the pricing of 
loans. 
Basel II allows banks to use two (groups) approaches for determining their capital 
requirements against credit risk: a) The Standardized approach, which refines the risk 
weights of the 1988 accord (Basel I) by the use of external ratings while leaving 
essentially unchanged the capital charges for loans to unrated companies. b) The Internal 
Rating Based (IRB) approach which allows banks to compute the capital charges for each 
exposure using their own estimates of probabilities of defaults (PD) and their Loss Given 
Defaults (LGD)2.   
Basel II represents a major change in banking regulation. As such it raises a series of 
important questions regarding its impact on the behavior of individual banks and on the 
banking system as a whole. Some of the important issues in this context are the effects of 
Basel II on banks’ capital levels an lending policies. These include the effects on  interest 
rate and the amounts of loans in different market segments: retail vs. corporate; domestic 
vs. emerging markets etc. The literature on these issues is rather limited, since the Basel II 
Capital Accord was published only recently. Cave, et al (2003) find a significant 
                                                 
1   Under Basel I, capital requirements are only weakly related to credit risk faced by the bank and no  
reference is made to operational risk. 
 2   Specifically, there are two proposed variants of the IRB approach; The foundation IRB (FIRB) approach 
in which the banks are expected to provide an estimate of the PDs of each borrower while a formula ( to 
be presented later in the paper) gives the corresponding capital charge: an Advanced IRB (AIRB) in 
which the banks also provide their own estimate of the LGD. In particular, if banks choose the IRB 
approach, they have to provide their own estimate of the LGD for retail customers. All the terms 
appearing in the capital charge formula will be defined and presented later in the paper.  
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reduction in capital requirements for commercial credit under the IRB approach compared 
with the current rule. French (2004), using data for all FDIC-insured banks, finds a large 
percentage reduction in capital requirements under the IRB approach.3 
Two recent papers deal with the pricing of loans under the new capital accord. Repullo 
and Suarez (2004) analyze the loan pricing implication of Basel II assuming a perfectly 
competitive market for business loans. Their model implies that low risk firms will have 
their loan rates reduced by banks using the IRB approach, while high risk firms will avoid 
increases in their loan rates by borrowing from banks adopting the Standardized approach 
of Basel II. Hasan and Zazzara (2006) propose a methodology for estimating risk-
adjusted rates for the banks’ corporate loans and Basel II capital requirements using EVA 
and RAROC.  
We investigate the impact of the two possible approaches (IRB and the Standardized 
approach), using the PD distribution of the bank’s loan customers. In this analysis we 
distinguish between households (retail customers) and corporates (wholesale customers). 
We analyze the different effects in the context of a model of a banking firm operating 
under uncertainty in an imperfectly competitive loan market. This particular structure was 
found to characterize most European banking systems in recent years See Claessens and 
Laeven (2004) and Berg and Kim (1998)4. 
In our loan pricing model the interest rate charged on loans has four components: the 
financial funding cost, risk premium to compensate for the risk of default by the 
borrower, a premium reflecting market power exercised by the bank, and the sensitivity 
of the cost of capital raised to changes in loans extended. Data on prices and quantities of 
retail and corporate lending are usually not directly available for individual banks, a 
limitation of numerous previous studies. We were able to obtain such data for one of the 
leading banks in Israel. This data enabled us to consider the effect of differential market 
power which the banks may be able to exercise on households relative to corporates. 
This is timely paper that both academic researchers as well as practitioners would benefit 
from its findings. Lack of proper data limits bank researchers to know more about the 
possible scenarios under the Basel II environment and this paper sheds some concrete 
evidence on the subject matter. 
                                                 
3  Liebig, Porath, di Mavro and Wedow (2004), using German bank level data, find that Basel II should 
have a limited effect on lending to emerging markets.   
 4 Berg and Kim (1998) study the oligopolistic behavior of multioutput banks which sell their outputs in  
    two distinct markets: retail and corporate banking markets using Norwegian banking data.  
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The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 briefly summarizes the Basel II Capital 
Accord, outlining the Standardized approach and the Internal Rating Based (IRB) 
approach. Section 3 presents the model of a banking firm used for determining the 
interest rate on loans in equilibrium. Since we are using Israeli data, Section 4 is devoted 
to a description of the structure and other features of the Israeli banking system. Section 5 
presents the empirical estimation (based on simultaneous equations, using Two Stage 
Least Squares regression analysis) of the possible impact of the new Capital Accord on 
the interest rates which the banks charge their two groups of customers: households and 
corporates. Section 6 summarizes the main results and presents their possible 
implications.  
 
2. Basel II Capital Requirements: The Standardized approach and the  
    Internal Rating Based (IRB) approach. 
Basel II permits banks a choice between two methodologies for calculating their capital 
requirements for credit risk: a) The Standardized approach which measures credit risk, 
primarily on the basis of credit assessments by external rating agencies; b) An Internal 
Rating-Based approach (IRB), which enables banks to use their internal rating system to 
measure credit risk. 
The Standardized approach revises the risk weights of the Basel I Accord (1988). Under 
the new approach, the range of weights of credit risk is expanded from the current range 
of 0% to 100% to a new range of 0% to 150%, where weights are determined by an 
external rating agency (for details see Table A1 in the appendix). 
The Internal Rating-Based Approach (IRB) of Basel II focuses on the frequency of bank 
insolvencies arising from credit losses. According to this approach the total loss (TS) of a 
bank for a certain confidence interval is given by the Value-at-Risk (VaR) threshold. This 
total loss (TS) can be decomposed to an expected loss (EL) – which should be covered by 
loan loss provisions, and to an unexpected loss (UL) – which should be covered by capital 
that provides a buffer for protecting the debt holders against extreme events. Capital is 
therefore determined according to the difference between total loss and expected loss.  
The IRB approach specifies the method of calculating the unexpected loss (UL) – to be 
covered by capital requirements for three types of asset classes (corporates, sovereigns 
and banks)5. The formula for calculating the capital requirements (K) as a percentage of 
                                                 
5 For other exposures such as retail and equity (stocks) there are several adjustments that are made in       
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the bank’s Exposure at Default (EAD) and the differentiation between unexpected loans 
(UL) and the expected loans (EL) are specified in part B of the appendix. 
 
3. The Loan Pricing Model  
The model of the optimal behavior of a commercial bank presented here assumes that the 
banks are risk neutral and that the banking industry is characterized by imperfect 
competition. This model is based on studies by Klein (1971) and Sealey (1980), which 
were applied and expanded in several studies of Israel’s banking system (for example 
Barnea, Landskroner, Paroush, and Ruthenberg, (1999) and Paroush and Ruthenberg 
(2003)).  
In our model, the commercial bank operates in the primary market, in which it raises 
deposits from the public and extends credit to it. The bank also operates in the secondary 
market in order to bridge between surpluses and deficits in its reserves, where this market 
involves transactions with other commercial banks (interbank deposits), with the central 
bank (monetary loans or deposits with the central bank), and in the financial markets 
(purchases and sales of Treasury securities, for example). In addition, the bank holds 
capital as required by the regulator, which serves as a cushion against unexpected losses 
(primarily from its credit portfolio).  
 We assume that the bank is risk neutral and its objective function is to maximize its 
expected profits with respect to its decision  variables, amount of loans (L) and deposits 
(D). The expected profits of the individual commercial bank in the short term, are: 
 
 
where,    
PD = Probability of Default 
L(RL ,α) = the demand function for bank credit that relates (negatively) to the own                               
interest rate (RL), and to a shift parameter α. The shift parameter may 
represent macro economic factors such as changes in GDP ( the income 
effect) and conditions in the capital markets (substitution effect). Thus, 
 
     
  
                                                                                                                                                  
   equation (1) through A*, ρ (see footnotes 8 and 9). 
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It should be emphasized that the shift parameter may also capture the effect of the 
business cycle on the demand for loans. Namely, an increase in the level of economic 
activity (an expansion) leads to an increase in demand for loans and eventually, 
equilibrium, amount of loans extended. This is consistent with the hypothesis that bank 
capital requirements are procyclical under Basel II6. Given risk neutrality, we obtain the 
following relationship between RL and the free-risk rate Rf: 
1
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D(Rd ,β)  = the supply function of the public’s deposits that are affected (positively) by 
the own interest rate (Rd ) and a shift parameter β.                      
Z = [L-(1-r)D]  is the activity of the bank in the secondary market, where r = the reserve 
requirement on public deposits. Z can be positive, negative or zero. 
If Z > 0, the bank has a shortage of sources in the primary market, and will have to raise 
funds in the secondary market at interest rate RW, e.g., discount-window 
borrowing or interbank borrowing. 
If Z < 0, the bank has excess sources (funds) and buys assets in the secondary market, 
such as deposits with the central bank, Treasury securities, earning an interest 
rate Rb. 
Given the activity in the secondary market, we define the interest rate, R, as  
follows:  
 
   
F   = the operating cost function of the bank, which we assume to be constant in the short          
term. 
 k    =  the cost of equity (required rate of return).   
K*  =  the required (regulatory) capital in monetary terms. 
Taking the first derivative of E(Π) in equation (1) with respect to L, assuming Z > 0, 
yields the following first order condition7:  
 
 
                                                 
6 Gordy and Howells (2006) examine the procyclicality issue from the perspective of market discipline: 
how it affects banks' lending policies and the efficacy of policy options.  
7 The assumption here is that EAD is equal to the amount of the bank’s outstanding loans (L), with the    
     result that .
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Rearranging the terms and summing over all banks, assuming that the market structure is 
Cournot-oligopolistic, yields an equality between marginal revenue (MR) and marginal 
cost (MC) as follows:  
 
  
   (2a)  
 
 
where, 
L
R
R
L L
L∂
∂−=η  is the elasticity of demand for loans; 
 is the Herfindahl-Hirschman index of concentration in the loan market                      
where, Si = (Li/L) is the market share of bank i in the loan market.  
Solving for (1+RL )  yields; 
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where, θ = RL - Rf  is the yield differential (i.e. the risk premium) which can also be 
written as PD(1 + RL) (see Paroush and Ruthenberg (2003)).      
From (3) it follows that the interest rate on loans is determined by the risk premium (θ); 
the industry’s market power as determined by its concentration (H); the market elasticity 
of demand for loans (η); the risk free rate (Rf) (such as the prime rate); the cost of raising 
funds in the secondary market – cost of debt (Rw); and the multiple of the cost of capital 
(equity) raised (k) by the sensitivity of the required capital to changes in the amount of 
loans extended .
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In general terms, the rate of interest on loans (equation (3)) can be written as follows:  
(1 + RL) = g (credit risk, market structure, cost of debt, cost of equity and the sensitivity 
of capital to loans extended) 
Figure 1 illustrates the sensitivity of bank loans and interest rates to capital charges and 
the cost of equity (k).  As can be seen, the rate of interest on loans (RL) ,after 
equating marginal revenue with marginal cost see equation (2A), may vary 
between RL1 and RL2. We claim that the distribution of RL under the new regime depends 
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(all else being equal) on the distribution of PD's of the bank’s loans to its retail customers 
and to corporates.  
As specified in the expected profits equation (1), the demand for loans is a function of the 
interest rate on loans (RL) and a shift parameter ( a~ ). In general terms, we write the 
demand for loans as follows; 
 
(4) 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Determining the interest rate on loans (RL) and the quantity of loans (L) 
in a non-competitive market in response to changes in capital requirements within 
the framework of the Basel II capital accord.           
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4. The structure of the Israeli Banking System 
At the end of 2005 the Israeli banking system was comprised of five large banking groups, two 
small independent banks, and two branches of large foreign banks (HSBC and Citibank). The 
number of banking corporations operating in Israel was 29 (15 commercial banks, 5 mortgage 
banks, 2 foreign banks and 7 other financial institutions) compared with 63 banking corporations 
that operated at the end of 1980. The decrease in the number of banks during that period is the 
result of bankruptcies or mergers and acquisitions, principally between small and large banks8.  
The Israeli banking system is characterized by a high degree of concentration; the largest three 
banking groups account for close to 77% of the system’s total assets, and the Herfindahl-
Hirschman index of concentration (H index) is 0.2289.  
Banks in Israel provide what can be described as universal banking services. In addition to 
classic banking intermediation, the large commercial banks heading the banking groups have 
subsidiaries that engage in several activities complementary to commercial banking. These 
activities include mortgage banking, credit cards, overseas banking (via subsidiaries and 
branches), direct and indirect ownership of companies that operate in the financial and capital 
markets (such as trading in securities, management of investment companies and investment 
banking), and insurance companies. The activities described above enable the banking groups to 
utilize economies of scale and scope and to diversify their risks more effectively than small 
independent banks (see Landskroner, Ruthenberg and Zaken, (2005)). 
The Israeli banks are active in three segments of intermediation: the unindexed local currency 
(nominal) segment (which accounts for approximately 40% of their total assets), the CPI-indexed 
segment, and the foreign currency segment (foreign-currency denominated and indexed). The 
share of the last two segments in the banks’ total assets is approximately 30% each. 
Another important feature of the Israeli banking system relates to capital adequacy. Although all 
banks meet the minimum capital adequacy requirement of 9%, the excess capital ratio above the 
minimum required in Israel is one of the lowest among developed countries10.  
 
 
 
                                                 
8 Commercial banks supply financial services via 992 branches and 1,370 ATMs (the number of which  
    increased substantially during the last 20 years) and via internet banking. 
  
9 The high concentration level in Israel is also reflected in international comparison: The H Index for the  
Israeli banking system's total assets was 0.228 in 2005, vs. an overall mean of 0.163 for foreign banking systems 
and 0.187 for Israel's peer group.  
10 For an updated detailed analysis of the Israeli banking system, see the Annual Survey of Israel's Banking System  
    (2005). 
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5. Empirical Estimation of Loan Pricing in the Israeli Banking System 
In this section we estimate the loan and interest rate equations in the unindexed local currency 
segment for retail and corporate customers. The main reason for using data on the unindexed 
segment is its availability, particularly the ability to distinguish between rates and the amount of 
loans extended to retail customers versus corporates. The assumption here is that the activity of 
commercial banks in the unindexed segment provides a good approximation for their total 
activity as financial intermediaries. 
Because of the simultaneity inherent in the analysis, as discussed above, the interest rate on loan-
equation (3) was estimated simultaneously with the demand for loans (Ld) – equation (4), using 
the Two Stage Least Squares (2SLS) technique.  
In general terms, the two equations comprising the system of equations are: 
 The interest rate on loans equation: RL = f (credit risk, market structure, cost of debt, cost of 
equity and the sensitivity of capital charges to loans extended). 
The demand for loans equation: Ld = g (interest rate on loans, the income effect (economic 
activity) and the substitution effect). 
All of the variables in the estimated equations were calculated after a logarithmic transformation 
was performed, with the exception of interest rates, yields and other variables that had negative 
values during the time of analysis, on which we performed a ln(1+x) transformation. The sample 
period of the study is September 1998 – May 2006, the frequency of the data is monthly and the 
bank-specific data were obtained from one of the largest banks in Israel.  
Since Basel II distinguishes between corporate customers and retail customers, we ran the system 
of equations separately for the two populations. Table 1 lists and defines the variables used in 
these equations while Table 2 summarizes the regression results for both samples. 
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able 1: Definitions, notations and the expected effects of the Independent variables 
Expected effect Notation MeasureVariable  
Lc For corporates: average amount of loans to corporates. 
 
LR 
For retail customers: average amount of loans to retail 
customers.
Demand for loans 
D
ep
en
de
nt
 
va
ri
ab
le
 
RLC 
For corporates: Interest income plus management fees divided 
by the average amount of loans.  
Negative 
RLR 
For retail customers: Interest income plus management fees 
divided by the average amount of loans. 
Interest rate on loans 
Positive ∆GDP% 
For corporates and retail customers: 
Percentage change in Gross Domestic Product.  
Income effect
Negative Pσ 
For corporates and retail customers: 
Standard deviation of expected inflation during 24 month 
period.
Negative %∆F 
For corporates and retail customers: 
Percentage change in funds (bonds and stocks) raised on the 
Tel Aviv stock exchange. 
Substitution effect
In
de
pe
nd
en
t v
ar
ia
bl
es
 
    
 
RLC 
For corporates: interest income plus management fees 
divided by the average amount of loans.  
 
RLR 
For retail customers: Interest income plus management fees 
divided by the average amount of loans. 
Interest rate on loans
D
ep
en
de
nt
 
va
ri
ab
le
 
LLPC 
For corporates: the ratio of loan loss provisions to the average 
amount of loans. 
Positive 
LLPR 
For retail customers: the ratio of loan loss provisions to the 
average amount of loans. 
Risk 
Positive MS 
For corporates and retail customers:  
Market share of total assets in the unindexed segment. 
Structure 
Positive TB 
Yield to maturity on a 1-year Treasury Bill. Cost of debt 
(secondary-market) 
Positive ⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡
∂
∗∂•
L
Kk
 
The multiple of the cost of equity ( k ), by ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
∂
∂ ∗
L
K  assumed 
to be 9%. 
Cost of equity 
sensitivity 
In
de
pe
nd
en
t v
ar
ia
bl
es
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Table 2: Regression Results of simultaneous equation system (using 2SLS) of loan  
                rates (RL) and demand for loans (Ld) for corporates and retail customers. 
                Monthly data, Sep 1998 - May 2006. 
a. Loan Rate Equation (RL) 
 Independent variables corporates retail customers 
 
Intercept  
 
-0.12 
(-2.24)** 
-0.06 
(-1.20) 
 
Loan loss provisions 
 ln (1+LLPC)t-3 
1.08 
(1.87)* 
 
 
Loan loss provisions  
ln(1+LLPR)t-1 
 
0.82 
(1.84)* 
 
Market share 
ln(1+ MS)t 
0.39 
(1.85)* 
0.40 
(2.12)** 
 
Cost of debt (secondary market) 
ln(1+TB)t 
1.35 
(8.99)*** 
1.10 
(14.42)*** 
 
Cost of equity sensitivity  
(ln(1+k)+ ln(1.09))t 
0.11 
(1.63)* 
0.07 
(1.97)** 
 AR(1) 
0.78 
(4.67)*** 
0.52 
(5.46)*** 
 D.W 2.25 2.11 
 2R  0.95 0.93 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 14
Continue 
b. Demand for Loans Equation (Ld) 
 Independent variables corporates retail customers 
 
Intercept 17.20 
(62.87)*** 
15.61 
(61.10)*** 
 
Interest rate on loans 
 ln(1+RLC)t 
-2.27 
(-1.62)* 
 
 
Interest rate on loans 
ln(1+RLR)t 
 
-1.06 
(-1.88)* 
 
Changes in Gross Domestic Product 
ln(1+%∆GDP)t-5 
0.41 
(1.68)* 
 
 
Changes in Gross Domestic Product 
ln(1+%∆GDP)t-3 
 
1.47 
(1.78)* 
 
Standard deviation of expected 
Inflation ln(1+σp)t-5 
-0.11 
(-1.78)* 
 
 
Standard deviation of expected 
Inflation ln(1+σp)t-2 
 
-0.09 
(-2.02)** 
 
Change in funds raised  
ln(1+%∆F)t-3 
0.0003 
(0.25) 
 
 AR(1) 
0.91 
    (14.80)*** 
0.80 
(10.68)*** 
 D.W 1.52 1.72 
 2R  0.98 0.77 
 
The t statistics appear in parentheses under the coefficient. 
***      Indicates significance at the 1% level 
**        Indicates significance at the 5% level 
*          Indicates significance at the 10% level 
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The main findings are as follows: 
Corporates;  
All the independent variables in the demand for loans equation with the exception of the 
substitution (contestability) variable (defined as funds raised on the Tel Aviv Stock Exchange) 
obtained their expected signs and were statistically significant:  
a) As expected, the change in Gross Domestic Product (GDP) which represents the income 
effect was found to have a positive impact on the demand for loans. This finding suggests 
that during periods of growth in the economy, the demand for loans by corporates increases 
while during periods of recession their demand for loans declines. 
b) The substitution effect was decomposed into substitution within the banking system, and 
substitution (contestability) facing the entire banking system. The substitution within the 
banking system is estimated as inflationary uncertainty (measured by the standard deviation 
of monthly inflation)11and as expected, has a negative impact on the banks' demand for loans. 
In this respect we assume that the demand for indexed loans is a substitute for unindexed 
local currency loans. With regard to contestability facing the entire banking system from 
substitutes for bank loans, we used the variable: funds (equity and bonds) raised by 
corporates on the TASE (Tel Aviv Stock Exchange). This variable was found to be 
statistically insignificant.  We can therefore conclude that during the period examined the 
stock market did not constitute a competitive threat to the banking system12.  
c) The interest rate charged on unindexed loans obtained a negative sign, as expected, and was 
found to be statistically significant.  
With respect to the interest rate equation, which is the main focus of this paper, all of the 
explanatory variables obtained their expected signs and were statistically significant. 
The explanatory variables in the interest rate equation include:  
a) Loan-loss provisions for corporates as a percent of loans extended. This variable represents 
the risk component in the interest rate equation (that is, a proxy for θ  in equation (3)), and as 
expected, was found to have a significant positive effect on the interest rate.  
b) The market share of the individual bank in total assets in the unindexed segment. This 
variable represents the structure in the unindexed loan market (a proxy for H in equation (3)) 
as expected it was found to have a positive and significant impact on the interest rate.  
                                                 
11 The standard deviation of inflation was calculated using monthly inflation during the previous 12 months.    
12 It should be noted that in recent years (since the beginning of 2003) there has been a significant increase in the 
amount of funds raised by corporates in the TASE as well as in the amount of funds raised through other non- 
banks sources. However, this period is probably too short to have a significant effect in our regression analysis.     
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c) The yield to maturity on a 1-year Treasury Bill. This variable represents the cost of debt in 
secondary market (Rw in equation (3)) and as expected, was found to have a positive impact 
on interest rate. 
d) The cost of equity sensitivity, namely the multiple of the cost of equity (k) by the sensitivity 
of capital charges to the amount of loans extended (
L
Κ*
∂
∂ ), was as expected found to have a 
positive and a significant impact on the interest rate.  
Although the bank's economic capital is composed of 2/3 core equity capital (tier 1) and 1/3 
subordinated debt (tier 2), we assumed that the bank's cost of capital is based on the cost of 
equity capital. For measurement purposes we applied the CAPM model, whereby the 
expected (required) return on equity of bank i (its cost of equity) is written as:  
 ki = E(Ri) = Rf + βi(RM – R0).   
      where: 
Rf  =  The risk free rate represented by the average annual yield to maturity on a Treasury 
Bill with 360 days maturity.  
RM  =  The market yield, represented by the average annual yield on the TA (Tel Aviv) 
100 index measured during a 5 year period13. 
βi =   The beta (βi) of bank i. This was estimated by a series of OLS regression equations of 
the monthly stock return of bank i (Ri ) on the monthly  return of the TA-100 index 
(RM), over a 24 month moving window: Ri = α0 + βiRM +ei. 
After adding to the loan regression equation the variable AR(1) (Autoregressive Error  Process of 
the first order), there was no evidence of a serial correlation, as reflected  by the values of the 
Durbin-Watson statistics. The adjusted R squares ( )2sR  were relatively high in the interest rate 
and the demand for loans regression equations (0.95 and 0.98 respectively).   
Retail customers: 
Similar equations were run for retail customers (mostly households). The results are also 
reported in Table 2 and the variables used are defined in Table 1. The regression results in 
respect of retail customers are for the most part encouraging, in the sense that all the independent 
variables obtained their expected signs and were statistically significant. However, there are 
several exceptions in these equations compared to those for corporates:  
1) In the loan demand equation the variable representing the substitution effect includes only 
the substitution within the banking system that is represented by the standard deviation of 
monthly inflation. The reason for the exclusion of a variable that represents the substitution 
                                                 
13  The TA-100 Index is one of the TASE's leading indices, published since 1992. The index consists of the 100  
     stocks with the highest market capitalization in Israel. 
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outside the banking system is that in Israel households, in contrast to corporates, do not have 
good substitutes outside of the banking system14. 
2) In the interest rate equation, the risk variable is measured by the loan loss provisions to retail 
customers.  
The adjusted R squares ( )2sR  were relatively high in both equations (0.93 and 0.77 in the interest 
rate and in the loan demand regression equations respectively). After introducing AR(1)  
variables there was no evidence of serial correlation in either of the equations. 
Out-of sample-prediction  
Based on the regression results (reported in Table 2), we performed a simulation (that is, out-of-
sample prediction) with regard to the interest rates which the bank would charge its corporate 
and the retail customers when the Basel II capital accord is implemented. The simulation is 
performed with respect to the two approaches available to banks: the Standardized approach and 
the Internal rating based (IRB) approach. 
With regard to corporates, the simulations are presented in figure 2. For the sake of 
convenience, we plotted both approaches on the same diagram therefore, the horizontal axis 
covers both PD's (for the IRB approach) and credit ratings (for the Standardized approach).  
The simulation was performed as follows: 
Firstly, we assume that the independent variables (loan loss provisions [LLP], market share [MS], 
Treasury Bills [TB] and cost of equity [k]), that appear in equation (3) and in Table 2, obtain their 
average values which prevailed during the period June 2003 – May 200615. The variable 
nA (1+
*
L
Κ
∂
∂ ), on the other hand, is assumed to be equal to zero, meaning that the PD's of 
customers is assumed to equal to zero. This assumption is necessary in order to derive the 
expected loan rates as a positive function of PD’s. Based on the above assumptions, the 
intercepts of the expected loan rates paths are obtained by multiplying the average values of the 
independent variables by their respective estimated coefficients as they appear in table 2. The 
two intercepts obtained are equal to 6.22% using the IRB approach and 6.42% for the 
Standardized approach. 
Secondly, after obtaining the two intercepts we assumed that from then onwards, loan rates are 
likely to be affected by the capital required according to the IRB approach based on equation 
(A1) in the appendix and the Standardized approach based on the weights reported in Table A1. 
                                                 
14  To verify this assertion we included the variable bonds and stocks raised in the TASE (i.e %∆F) in the    
     demand for loans by retail customers' equation. This however proved to be insignificant.         
 
15 It should be emphasized that this period was characterized by a growth in the Israeli economy after few years of 
recession, and we assume that during the next three years the economy will continue to grow. 
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As can be seen, the average actual effective loan rate for corporates for the period June 2003-
May 2006, was 7.49%. The break-even point (the intersection of the actual rate with the expected 
rate) yields a PD of 5.3% for the IRB approach and a PD of 10% for the Standardized approach.  
The diagram shows that all corporate customers with PD's lower than 9.4% (which is the 
intersection of the expected rate of the IRB and the Standardized approach), approximately 95% 
of corporate customers will be charged a rate of interest lower than the average prevailing during 
the last three year period.16 This lower rate will be charged by banks adopting the IRB approach. 
On the other hand, with banks adopting the Standardized approach, the reduction in the loan 
rates will be available to customers with a PD higher than 9.4%. 
From the above analysis we can therefore conclude that high quality (low risk) customers will 
enjoy a reduction in loan rates only at banks that adopt the IRB approach as opposed to the 
Standardized approach. On the other hand, the low quality (high risk) customers, those with PD's 
higher than 9.4%, will be better off obtaining loans from banks which adopt the Standardized 
approach17. These results are similar to those obtained by Repullo and Suarez (2004) however, 
our model differs from theirs in that we consider an imperfectly competitive banking market.     
We performed the same type of analysis for retail customers (Figure 3). 
The results are similar to the ones obtained for corporates although the values of the PD's in 
equilibrium are different. It is possible to conclude from the Figure that retail customers with 
PD's lower than 13.4% will prefer banks that adopt an IRB approach while very risky customers 
(with PD's higher than 13.4%) will prefer banks that adopt the Standardized approach.18 It can be 
concluded from the above analysis that nearly all retail customers will prefer banks that adopt an 
IRB approach19. 
                                                 
16 The average PD for small / medium corporates was found to be 1.61% for other non-G10 Group 1 countries by  
   Basel quantitative impact study (BIS 2006a).    
17 That is we may expect a shift in the demand for loans between banks according to the quality of the borrowers 
depending on the approach adopted by the banks.    
18 The average PD for other retail customers was found to be 2.77% for other non-G10 Group 1 countries by the 
Basel quantitative impact study (BIS 2006a).   
19 It should be emphasized that the actual loan rates charged to retail customers are higher than those charged to 
corporates (for example, during the period 3.2006-5.2006 it was 11.43% vs. 7.49% respectively). This difference 
in the rates is reflected in the higher market power banks exercise on retail customers as opposed to corporates.  
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Figure 2: The actual loan rate (6.2003-5.2006) against the expected loan rate (based on  
Regression equations 3 and 4)  according to a Standardized approach and an IRB 
approach of Basel ІІ, effective annual terms, Corporates ; 09/1998-05/2006 
 
 
 
Figure 3: The actual loan rate (6.2003-5.2006) against the expected loan rate (based on  
Regression equations 3 and 4) according to a Standardized approach and an IRB 
approach of Basel ІІ,  effective annual terms, Retail ; 09/1998-05/2006  
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6.  Summary and conclusions  
In this paper we derive a loan rate equation for a commercial bank, assuming that the bank is risk 
neutral and operates in a market characterized by imperfect competition. Based on the data of a 
leading bank in Israel and the PD’s of its customers, by means of simultaneous equations 
regression analysis (using Two-Stage-Least-Squares technique), we estimated the impact of the 
Basel II capital accord on the loan rates which banks will charge their corporate and retail 
customers under the Standardized and the Internal based approaches (IRB).  
The results show categorically that high quality (low risk) corporate customers will enjoy a 
reduction in loan rates if they obtain loans from banks that adopt an IRB model. On the other 
hand, low quality (high risk) corporate customers will enjoy a reduction in loan rates only if they 
obtain loans from banks that adopt the standardized approach. 
With respect to retail customers, almost all these customers will enjoy a loan rate reduction if 
they obtain loans from banks that adopt the IRB approach. 
These results have a direct implication on the risk distribution among banks. In particular, the 
large and high quality banks, which are expected to adopt the IRB approach, will tend to serve 
the less risky customers while the small and low quality banks, which are expected to adopt the 
Standardized approach, will thus tend to serve the more risky customers.  
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Appendix: 
Table A1: Risk weights for capital allocation according to the Standardized  
                approach of Basel II (percent) 
                 Credit                   
Assessment 
 
Claims on 
AAA 
to  
AA- 
A+ 
to 
A- 
BBB+ 
to 
BBB- 
BB+ 
to 
B- 
Below 
B- 
Unrated 
Sovereigns 0 20 50 100 150 100 
Banks Option 1 20 50 100 100 150 100 
 Option 2 risk weights are based on external credit assessment 
 Up to 3 months  20 20 20 50 150 20 
 Over 3 months 20 50 50 100 150 50 
                 Credit                   
Assessment 
Claims on 
AAA 
to  
AA- 
A+ 
to 
A- 
BBB+ 
to 
BB - 
Below  
BB- 
Unrated 
Corporates 20 50 100 150 100 
1) The risk weight for retail portfolios (individual person or persons or small businesses) which meet 
certain criteria (product, diversification of retail portfolio, low value of individual exposure) is 75% 
(in Basel I the risk weight was 100%). 
2) The risk weight for lending secured by mortgages on residential property is 35% (in Basel I the risk 
weight was 50%). 
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B. The formula for calculating the capital requirement under the IRB approach: 
The formula for calculating the capital requirements (K) as a percentage of the bank’s Exposure 
at Default (EAD), which is based on a model assuming portfolio invariance (Gordy 2003)20 and 
the normal distribution function to measure the borrower's PD (Vasicek 2002) is21:     
 
(A1)  
 
Alternatively to equation (A1), the unexpected loss (UL) or the required capital as a percent of 
EAD can be written as follows: 
 
 
 
where,  
PD   = probability of default, per rating grade, which gives the average percentage of borrowers 
that default in this rating (normally in the course of one year). 
LGD = loss given default, which is the percentage of exposure which the bank might lose if the 
borrower defaults i.e., (1- Recovery rate). 
EAD = exposure at default, which is an estimate of the amount of credit outstanding if the 
borrower defaults.      
N (x) = the cumulative distribution function for a standard normal random variable (i.e. the 
probability that a normal random variable with mean zero and variance of one is less or 
equal to x).       
N-1(x) = the inverse cumulative distribution function for a standard normal random variable.            
  
As the equation shows, the Basel Committee chose 99.9% percentile confidence interval, where, 
N-1(0.999) ≈ 3.09. 
ρ = the weighted (by λ) correlation between the different exposures (different credits), 
determined by the Basel committee which shows how the asset value of one borrower 
(exposure) depends on the asset value of another borrower (exposure)22.  
                                                 
20 Portfolio invariance means that the capital required for any given loan should only depend on the risk  (PD, LGD 
and EAD) of that loan and must not depend on the risk of the portfolio it is part of. This characteristic is essential 
for calculating and applying the IRB framework, as presented in equation (4). Otherwise, one has to recognize the 
diversification effect of the loan portfolio in calculating the capital charges (K).      
21 For further explanation for formula (A1) and the meanings of its components see BIS (2005).  
22 The equation of ρ is:  ρ(PD)=0.12λ+0.24(1- λ) – 0.04[1-(S-5)/45] where, ⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎢⎢⎣
⎡
−
−= −
×−
)50(
)50(
1
1
e
e PDλ and S = the size 
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A* = a component used to adjust capital requirements to the effective time to maturity (M) and to 
the probability of default (PD) 23.    
Accordingly, the unexpected losses (UL) in monetary terms, K*, can be written as: 
.EADKK* ×=   
It can be shown that PD, LGD and EAD are positively related to K24: 
 
 
 
                                                 
23 The A* component is specified as follows: ( )( ) ( ) ( )( ){ }PDb.MPDb.)PD,M(A* ×−+×−= − 521511 1  
   where, the coefficient b is determined by the Basel Committee as [ ]2054780118520 )PDln(.).(b ×−=   
   The formula for the effective time to maturity is: ∑∑ ×=
t
t
t
t CFCFtM                                                                         
  where, CFt = The cash flows (principal, interest payments and fees) of the loan in period t.  
   Both, theoretical and empirical evidence suggest that long-term credits are riskier than short-term credits. As a 
consequence, the capital requirement (K) should increase with maturity (M); .0>∂
∂
M
K    
  
24 It can also be shown, that in the relevant range, .K 0>∂
∂
ρ An intuitive explanation to the positive relation     
between ρ and K is the fact that as the correlation between the components of the loan portfolio                    
(borrowers or sectors) is lower, loan portfolio is more dispersed or less risky, and less capital is therefore required 
to cover the unexpected losses in the loan portfolio. The opposite will happen when the    correlation between the 
components of the loan portfolio is higher. 
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